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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir.
2013).
Jill Hughes

ABSTRACT
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, this Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
case addressed whether several government entities were liable under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) for pollution exceedances in the LA MS4 stormwater drainage system. The Defendants,
the County of Los Angeles (County) and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District
(District), argued proof of the portion of individual entity discharge was required to determine
liability under the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and
Santa Monica Baykeeper, argued that Defendants violated the terms of their National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and were therefore liable, despite lack of data
determining the County’s proportional contribution to exceedances. The Ninth Circuit held
aviolation of the permit was sufficient to establish liability as a matter of law and that
compliance requires each permittee who contributes to exceedances to mitigate its own
discharges to avoid liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Natural Resources Defense Council v. County of Los Angeles,1 addressed whether the
County and District were liable for exceeding pollution levels in the Los Angeles municipal
storm sewer system (LA MS4), according to the terms of the NPDES permit under the Clean
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Water Act.2 The Ninth Circuit held the pollution exceedances created liability as a matter of law
according to permit construction.3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the County of Los Angeles, stormwater runs through an intricate sewer system called
LA MS4, which gathers substantial pollution.4 The infrastructure is managed and monitored by
the County and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District.5 It is undisputed that the San
Gabriel and Los Angeles rivers receive untreated stormwater discharges from the outfalls of the
system, which drain into Santa Monica Bay and the Pacific Ocean.6
The NPDES permit issued for the LA MS4 requires permittees to comply with discharge
prohibitions and pollution standards.7 The permit also includes the Monitoring and Reporting
Program, which requires measurement of the impacts of the LA MS4 discharges for the purpose
of “assessing compliance.”8 The monitoring requirement enables mass-emissions trend
assessment and determination if LA MS4 is contributing to water quality exceedances.9 Between
2002 and 2008, the monitoring stations detected 140 separate water quality violations.10
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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NRDC filed suit March 3, 2008, claiming violations of NPDES permit limits
automatically gave rise to liability for the County and District.11 The district court bifurcated the
issues of liability and remedy, staying proceedings on remedy until a final determination of
liability. In 2010, the district court held plaintiff’s claims were unsubstantiated because they
lacked evidence of discharges by individual outflows in the District.12 The court then
determined an interlocutory appeal was needed to settle the question of what level of proof is
required to establish liability of the Defendants.13
The Ninth Circuit held the District liable, despite requesting additional evidence of the
individual Defendant discharges constituting permit violations.14 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari only to address whether channeling polluted water from one section of a
navigable river to another section of the same river constituted a discharge under the CWA.15
The Supreme Court highlighted that its holding did not address the issue of liability for permit
violations and reversed and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court.16
IV. ANALYSIS
Upon second hearing at the Ninth Circuit, the district court’s holding of summary
judgment was reviewed de novo.17 The Ninth Circuit never issued a mandate based on its initial
consideration of the case.18 A circuit court’s holding does not become controlling law until a
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mandate is issued.19 Because the Ninth Circuit’s initial decision was not controlling law, the
court had discretion to reconsider the case on its merits.20
A. Permit Plain Language
A permittee violates the Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants in surplus of the
limits of the NPDES permit.21 To analyze Defendant liability resulting from violation, the court
turned to the text of the NPDES permit, interpreting the permit as it would any other contract.22
The County argued the purpose of the monitoring program was not to measure compliance with
water quality standards.23 However, the court found the terms of the permit to hold precisely the
opposite, including “stated objectives of both characterizing stormwater discharges and assessing
compliance with water quality standards.”24 Under the plain meaning of the text as a whole, the
court held the Defendants’ interpretation of the permit unreasonable.25 The court further held
that the question of the County’s portioned contribution goes to the remedy of the case, not the
liability.26 Each permittee “must take appropriate remedial measures with respect to its own
discharges.”27 If pollution levels exceed permit allowances, then “as a matter of permit
construction” the Defendants are not in compliance and are liable.28
B. Additional Considerations
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The court determined that numerous considerations undermined the foundations of the
Defendants’ argument.29 The first was the regulation governing NPDES permits.30 Under 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(i)(F), the permit mandated monitoring of discharges to assure compliance
with its terms.31 Second, the governing body that issued the permit, the Regional Board, rejected
the Defendants’ interpretation of the permit.32 The permitting agency’s intent is an obligatory
factor of interpretation.33 Third, the purposes of the CWA undercut Defendants’ assertions as
Congress created the “self-monitoring mechanism” of the NPDES program to streamline
enforcement of the provisions.34
V. CONCLUSION
In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court held an NPDES permit’s plain meaning was
sufficient to determine the obligations of permittees and hold them liable under the CWA for
contributing to pollution exceedances in the LA MS4 stormwater drainage system. The court
further held additional factors undermined the Defendants’ arguments, including the “selfmonitoring” focus of the CWA, the Regional Board’s rejection of the Defendants’ permit
interpretation, and regulated compliance measures of the NPDES program. This holding sends a
message to primary permittees under NPDES permits that they will be held to the standards of
the CWA and be liable if they violate it.
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